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UNIVERSIDAD
CATÓLICA
DE CHILE

Departamento de Ingeniería de
Transporte y Logística



CENTRE OF
EXCELLENCE

THE IMPACT OF ASSUMING ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR IN THE LIMITED-STOP BUS SERVICE DESIGN PROBLEM

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OUTLINE

- Limited-stop services
- Designing Limited-stop services
- Naïve approach to passenger assignment
- Case study – magnitude of the error
- Conclusion



LIMITED-STOP BUS SERVICES

Travel times :)

Waiting times :(

Transfers :(

Operator costs :)



LIMITED-STOP BUS SERVICES


■ TransMilenio Bogotá



- 45,000 pax/h
- 25 km/h


DESIGNING LIMITED-STOP BUS SERVICES

- Service generation problem
- Service design problem
- Passenger assignment problem




DESIGNING LIMITED-STOP BUS SERVICES

■ Service generation problem





■ Service design & Passenger assignment problem



DESIGNING LIMITED-STOP BUS SERVICES

- **Service design & Passenger assignment problem**



Individual passengers minimizes their own travel time

This argument is invalid when capacity constraints are active

EXAMPLE

■ Meal Distribution in Airplane



- # Passengers – 100

- Meal preferences

Meat – 50

Veg. – 30

Meat / Veg. – 20

EXAMPLE

■ Meal Distribution in Airplane

1. Cost is very low / No capacity

Social Optimum

Meat – 70

Veg. – 50

- # Passengers – 100

- Meal preferences

Meat – 50

Veg. – 30

Meat / Veg. – 20

2. Cost is considered / With capacity

Social Optimum

Meat – 50

Veg. – 50

User Optimum

Meat – 60

Veg. – 40

10
Passengers
will not be
Pleased

EXAMPLE

■ Meal Distribution in Airplane

1. Cost is very low / No capacity

Social Optimum

Meat – 70

Veg. – 50



■ User optimum

✓ Selfish

✓ Good forecast

2. Cost is considered / With capacity

Social Optimum

Meat – 50

Veg. – 50




■ User optimum

✓ Selfish

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DESIGNING LIMITED-STOP BUS SERVICES


▪ Service design & Passenger assignment problem



- Key challenges
 - Non-linear problem
 - Passenger assignment is not trivial


BEHAVIOR

■ Itineraries



ASSUMPTIONS

- Passengers follow Itineraries
- Make forward transfers
- Predefined set of services



- Over a given corridor

BEHAVIOR V/S CAPACITY

- Objective: *Minimize total social cost*

Itineraries

Service design

Behavior (P.A.)

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Minimize } \left[\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} c_l \cdot f_l \right. \\
 & \quad + \theta_{wt} \left\{ \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} \sum_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{S}_l} \left(\frac{k}{f_l} \right) \cdot x_{ij}^{w,l} \right\} \\
 & \quad \left. + \theta_{tt} \left\{ \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} \sum_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{S}_l} t_{ij}^l \cdot x_{ij}^{w,l} \right\} \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

Operating cost

Waiting cost

In-vehicle travel cost

Transfer cost

User cost

Total social cost

s.t.: non-negativity and flow conservation.

EXAMPLE

- Meal Distribution in Airplane

1. Cost is very low / No capacity

Social Optimum

Meat – 70

Veg. – 50



- User optimum

- ✓ Selfish

- ✓ Good forecast

What if we want to model
Capacity?



BEHAVIOR V/S CAPACITY

- Objective: *Minimize total social cost*

Itineraries

Service design → *Behavior (P.A.)*

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Minimize } \left[\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} C_l \cdot f_l \right. \\
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 & \quad \left. + \text{Transfer cost} \right\}
 \end{aligned}$$

Operating cost

Waiting cost

In-vehicle travel cost

Transfer cost

User cost

Total social cost

- Capacity constraints

$$\sum_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{S}_l} \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} x_{ij}^{w,l} \cdot \beta_a^{ij} \leq f_l \cdot b_l, \quad l \in \mathcal{L}, a \in A$$

s.t.:

non-negativity and flow conservation.

EXAMPLE

- Meal Distribution in Airplane

2. Cost is considered / With capacity

Social Optimum

Meat – 50

Veg. – 50



- User optimum
 - ✓ Selfish
 - ✓ Good forecast

GAPS

- Our previous works have addressed this
 - Leiva et al. (2010)
 - Larrain et al. (2013)
 - Soto et al. (2017)
- Error induced by this simplification has not been studied
- Researchers are using this



Dimensioning the Effect of Direct Approach

■ Solve the Naïve Approach With Capacity constraint

- Service Design ($\overline{f_l^*}$)
- Passenger Assignment ($\overline{x_s^{w,l}}$)
 - Altruistic
 - May not be consistent with reality

■ Realistic Passenger Assignment User Equilibrium How bad is this solution?


■ Unconstrained passenger assignment ($\overline{\overline{x_s^{w,l}}}$)

- Given Service Design ($\overline{f_l^*}$)
- Passenger Assignment ($\overline{\overline{x_s^{w,l}}}$) Without Capacity constraint

Compare
Altruistic PA ($\overline{x_s^{w,l}}$) V/S Unconstrained PA ($\overline{\overline{x_s^{w,l}}}$)

Performance Indicators

1) Level of passenger-kilometer (PKM) diversion




$$\% \Delta pkmD = 100 \left(\frac{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \left(\max_{l \in \mathcal{L}, w \in \mathcal{W}, s \in \mathcal{S}} \{ \overline{\overline{x}}_s^{w,l} - \overline{x}_s^{w,l}, 0 \} \cdot d_s^l \right)}{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} \sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \left(\overline{\overline{x}}_s^{w,l} \cdot d_s^l \right)} \right)$$

2) Level of infeasibility in the service design

$$\% \Delta f_l = 100 \left(\frac{\max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ \frac{\sum_{w \in \mathcal{W}} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \overline{\overline{x}}_s^{w,l} \cdot \beta_a^s}{b_l} - \overline{f}_l^*, 0 \right\}}{\overline{f}_l^*} \right), \quad \forall l \in \mathcal{L}$$

Case Study

- A five stop bus corridor with three services.
- Passengers follow itineraries to reach their destination.
- Only allow forward transfers.
- Neglect congestion.



A 5-stop bus corridor with three services

Travel demand matrix (pax/h)

O-D	1	2	3	4	5
1	-	10,000	8,000	1,000	5,000
2	-	-	10,000	0	1,000
3	-	-	-	8,000	10,000
4	-	-	-	-	5,000
5	-	-	-	-	-

Experiments

Sets of experiments	Range	Interval	#Scenarios
Bus capacity (b)	30 - 270	10	25
Value of waiting time (θ_{wt})	0 - 1200	50	25
Value of in-vehicle travel time (θ_{tt})	0 - 1500	50	31
Value of transfer penalty (θ_{tr})	0 - 200	25	9
			87

■ Base scenario

- Bus capacity (b) = 50 (pax/bus)
- Value of waiting time (θ_{wt}) = 100 (CLP/min)
- Value of in-vehicle travel time (θ_{tt}) = 100 (CLP/min)
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Experiments


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
Impact with Bus Capacity

Passenger-Kilometer (PKM) Diversion



Impact with Bus Capacity

Infeasibility in Service Design



Experiments


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
Impact with Value of Waiting Time

Passenger-Kilometer (PKM) Diversion



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CONCLUSIONS

- Altruistic passenger assignment is inconsistent with the reality.
- Naïve approach underestimates the required frequencies.
- Its impact might be pronounced more in congested networks.
- Future scope: **User Equilibrium** passenger assignment.



Thank you

Questions ?





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

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Results for Base Scenario

Scenario				PKM Diversion	Infeasibility in Service Design		
b	θ_{wt}	θ_{tt}	θ_{tr}		L1	L2	L3
50	100	100	100	5.4 %	9.1 %	11.1 %	0.0 %



CONCLUSIONS

- Altruistic passenger assignment is inconsistent with the reality.
- Naïve approach underestimates the required frequencies.
- Its impact might be pronounced more in congested networks.
- Similar experiments for - **Routes** instead of itineraries.
- Not providing enough capacity by just a little bit may affect much more people than if we fail by a large amount.
- Future scope: **User Equilibrium** passenger assignment.